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Monetary sanctions are a ubiquitous part of court systems. Previous studies have focused largely on these
sanctions at the state level or solely on large urban jurisdictions. However, court systems differ considerably
across communities of varying population size, composition, and density. This article examines how differences in court structure and organizational dynamics in communities across the rural-urban continuum
lead to differences in how court actors consider the role of monetary sanctions. Using interviews with court
actors and ethnographic observations in communities across four states, we find that the practical and symbolic nature of monetary sanctions varied by the acquaintanceship density of the court and community.
These interpersonal dynamics influenced courtroom considerations, monetary sanctions’ relationship to local finances, and actors’ positioning toward state-level policy. These findings emphasize the importance of
court and community context and structure in assessing the law-in-action both when conducting research
and designing reform.
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Researchers have established that monetary
sanctions are a ubiquitous and growing aspect
of court systems across the United States (Harris 2016; Martin et al. 2018; Shannon, Huebner

et al. 2020). Monetary sanctions, also referred
to as legal financial obligations (LFOs), encompass the wide variety of fines, fees, assessments, and surcharges imposed on individuals
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in the criminal justice system. Following the
fiscal pressures of protracted economic downturns, shifts in federal funding, and the high
costs of mass incarceration, cities and counties
have increasingly turned to monetary sanctions
as a form of revenue generation, aiming to shift
the burden from taxpayers to system users
(Graham and Makowsky 2021; Katzenstein and
Waller 2015; Martin 2020). Scholarship to date
has focused largely on the consequences of the
increased use of monetary sanctions for defendants (Pleggenkuhle 2018; Link 2019; Harris
2016). Less attention has been paid to the local
factors that shape the meaning and application
of monetary sanctions among court actors in
the context of these broader shifts.
Early scholarship on monetary sanctions
centered on state-level analyses because the
amounts of fines and fees are often dictated by
state statute (Harris et al. 2017). However, court
systems are highly localized institutions and
have significant discretion in how they carry
out the law-on-the-books. Local court systems
have some autonomy over sentencing decisions, supervision practices, and collection efforts (Olson and Ramker 2001; Shannon, Huebner et al. 2020; Pacewicz and Robinson 2020).
Alexes Harris (2016) finds that courts in Washington varied considerably in their use of monetary sanctions in ways that were not explained
by the nature of the offense, statute, or defendant characteristics, but rather reflected different localized “punishment cultures.” In addition to local norms and cultures, structural
variations of communities and court systems
result in distinct constraints in fiscal resources,
time, and personnel that impact how justice is
performed and enacted (Cebulak 2004; Pruitt
et al. 2018; Statz 2021). For example, relative to
court systems in large cities, courts in rural and
suburban areas tend to have fewer employees,
more limited resources, such as fewer public
defenders, probation and supervision services,
and less programming such as diversion or specialty courts (Huebner, Kras, and Pleggenkuhle
2019; McDonald, Wood, and Pflüg 1996; Pruitt
and Colgan 2010; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells
1999; Statz 2021). We add to this growing scholarship by exploring the influence of these structural and organizational features on monetary
sanctions.
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Although courts across the United States
share some basic features, it is well recognized
that local community contexts shape many of
the interpersonal dynamics relevant to case
outcomes (Ulmer 2019; Ulmer and Kramer 1998;
Statz 2021). Communities vary greatly in ways
that are difficult to classify. One key axis of variation is acquaintanceship density, which can
be used to understand differences across rural,
suburban, and urban communities. Acquaintanceship density is defined as the proportion
of community residents known to individuals
or the degree of familiarity between residents
(Weber 1958; Freudenberg 1986). Although it is
not the only difference between these types of
communities in terms of how the law is carried
out, existing legal research, as well as research
on monetary sanctions, has highlighted the importance of interpersonal dynamics in court
systems through the conceptualization of
courts as “inhabited institutions”—which are
driven by both the motivations of individuals
(Ulmer 2019; Martin, Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk
2022, this volume; Smith, Thompson, and Cadigan 2022, this volume) and the shared goals
and norms of courtroom “workgroups”—or
members of the court tasked with carrying out
the court process (Eisenstein and Jacob 1977;
Haynes, Ruback, and Cusick 2010). We extend
these two complementary lines of research on
acquaintanceship density and courtroom workgroups to understand courts as both inhabited
by actors with particular sets of norms, practices, and expectations and as nested within
communities that impose external constraints
and structures that impact justice processes.
In this article, we explore the relationship
between monetary sanctions and interpersonal
and structural dynamics of courts and their respective locales, comparing across a spectrum
of community population size and density.
Court actors in these different community
types varied in their conceptualizations of both
the practical and symbolic nature of monetary
sanctions. Using acquaintanceship density as
a lens to view community and structural differences reveals that community context matters
in courtroom interactions surrounding monetary sanctions, considerations of local finances, and court actors’ perceived agency and
discretion. These differences in LFO regimes

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

202

state mon eta ry sa nctions a n d the costs of the cr imina l lega l system

have consequences both to defendants and to
local actors’ support for reform efforts. Our
findings draw on courtroom ethnographies and
qualitative interviews with courtroom actors
across four states: Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota,
and Missouri.
We add to the existing literature in several
ways. First, much of what is known about American courts is confined to urban jurisdictions.
This research explores further the role of community size and relations in court proceedings.
Second, exploring how court actors understand
the role of monetary sanctions outside of imposing punishment has serious implications
for the success and well-being of defendants.
Monetary sanctions reproduce inequality both
through the financial burden they impose (Harris 2016; Bing, Pettit, and Slavinski 2022, this
volume; Boches et al. 2022, this volume; Harris
and Smith 2022, this volume) and through the
court’s efforts to collect and manage this debt
(Cadigan and Kirk 2020; Martin, Spencer-
Suarez, and Kirk 2022, this volume). Our findings speak to the importance of considering
organizational structure and context when assessing the law-in-action, particularly in examining sanctions that are motivated by multiple
incentives, both punishment and funding, as
is the case with monetary sanctions.
C o u r t s , C o mm u n i t i e s , a n d
Ac q ua i n ta n c e s h i p D e n s i t y

Courtrooms and courthouses are at their core
professional organizations, with groups of actors who more often work in cooperation than
in conflict (Eisenstein and Jacob 1977). Researchers have found that organizational dynamics at the county or jurisdiction level, such
as the relationships and power dynamics between court actors, are particularly important
in translating policies and statutes into individual case outcomes (Ulmer 2019). In viewing
the courts as organizations, the criminologist
Jeffery Ulmer draws on the concept of “inhabited institutions” to detail “how organizational
participants constantly interpret and make
sense of rules and structures” (2019, 484). Ulmer’s research emphasizes the need to examine
interpretation, culture, and court processes to
understand sentencing outcomes. Several
scholars have begun to turn toward the inhab-

ited institutions perspective when examining
differences in the imposition of monetary sanctions (Martin, Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk 2022,
this volume; Shannon, Harris, et al. 2020;
Smith, Thompson, and Cadigan 2022, this volume).
In a similar vein, scholars have conceptualized groups of court actors as workgroups who
share similar goals of doing justice, managing
cases, and processing defendants and therefore
develop routines and norms to accomplish
these goals quickly and efficiently (Eisenstein
and Jacob 1977; Eisenstein, Fleming, and Nardulli 1988; Galanter 1974; Metcalfe 2016; Haynes,
Ruback, and Cusick 2010). These workgroups
result in the maintenance of micro-level norms
and legal interpretations over time and across
cases (Eisenstein, Fleming, and Nardulli 1988;
Smith, Thompson, and Cadigan 2022, this volume; Ulmer 2019). They also differ across courts
that vary in their social, political, and organizational contexts (Dixon 1995; Ulmer 2019). Significantly, they are influential in determining
the sum of monetary sanctions imposed, the
amount of time allowed for repayment, and the
norms surrounding collection strategies (Martin, Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk 2022, this volume).
Prior work has established that broader
community contexts influence interpersonal
dynamics within the courtroom, but less attention has been paid to the relevant dimensions
and distinguishing features that shape courtroom processes and outcomes. Differences in
population size and density—which roughly
correspond to differences in rural, urban, and
suburban designations (Butler and Beale 1993;
Isserman 2005; Tickameyer 2000)—shape the
salient concerns and priorities of the court.
Thus, even if cultural orientations toward criminal justice and punishment are similar, variation across communities in their structure,
size, and resources can affect organizational
dynamics and punishment outcomes (Lichter
and Brown 2011; Beckett and Beach 2021; Eason,
Zucker, and Wildeman 2017). Larger court systems have been found to bring greater opportunities for bureaucratization (Feld 1991; Hagan
1977). Smaller ones often have more stable
workgroups made up of more “regular, repeat
players” (Eisenstein, Fleming, and Nardulli
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1988; Galanter 1974; Metcalfe 2016; Strauss
1993). Policing, prosecutorial, and defense resources may be limited in smaller communities, as is the ability to impose alternative sentences such as community service and drug
treatment (Pruitt et al. 2018). Taken together,
these differences in structure and resources alter how justice is enacted.
One distinction between communities of different population sizes and densities is the concept of density of acquaintanceship, which refers to the proportion of community residents
known to individuals (Weber 1958). Early work
on acquaintanceship ratios theorized links to
individual-level outcomes (such as psychosocial
isolation). William Freudenberg (1986) was
among the first to consider the importance of
density of acquaintanceship at the community-
level. He argues that antecedent characteristics
such as population size and density, as well as
population dynamics such as residential stability and ethnic homogeneity, could alter the extent of anonymity and acquaintanceship among
residents. Subsequently, the density of acquaintanceship shapes how communities cooperatively address community problems, secure
public resources, and impose social norms
(Flora et al. 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989).
Research generally suggests that despite
substantial economic and demographic transformations, residential mobility is lower in rural communities (Fitchen 1994; Foulkes and
Newbold 2008; Thiede, Kim, and Valasik 2018).
Where populations are smaller, they are more
likely to have higher kinship ties and acquaintanceships (Flaherty and Brown 2010; Freudenberg 1986; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 1999).
Small populations also increase the likelihood
of “role homogeneity,” defined as the extent to
which community members interact with each
other across a number of identities and roles
(Flora et al. 1997). In other words, the linkages
between persons are reinforced across several
daily interactions. Finally, stability contributes
to the networks of all communities. Thus, although urban residents report less intimate
networks, residents in stable communities also
indicate that their acquaintanceships are more
expansive (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlburt 1996;
Wilkinson 1984; Wirth 1938).
Acquaintanceship density is a useful lens
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through which to view differences in interactive
court processes on several fronts. First, acquaintanceship densities operate as a pathway
for both establishing social norms and resolving violations of those norms, often without the
formal intervention of the criminal justice system. According to Donald Black (1976, 47), the
degree to which people participate in each other’s lives, also termed relational distance, shapes
whether individuals activate the law, and more
important, if such enactments are stylized as
adversarial and punitive or remedial and conciliatory. Communities with more dense community ties may choose to resolve disputes
(such as loud music, unleashed dogs, and so
on) informally, shaping the likelihood that violating behavior enters the court system at all
(Leverentz and Williams 2017; Singer 2014;
Payne, Berg, and Sun 2005).
Second, acquaintanceship densities contribute to the organizational practices and cultures
of the court (Black 1976). Kathryn Fahnestock
and Maurice Geiger (1993) note that the interpersonal distances between court actors, as
well as between court actors and defendants,
generated greater informality in proceedings
and, perhaps more consequentially, a longer
time for case resolution. Courtroom workgroups in urban environments are relatively
stable, often in response to a shared bureaucratic goal of efficient case processing (Ulmer
1995). In rural communities, court actors are
more likely to know personally, not only the
other court actors, but also the defendant and
the victim (Cebulak 2004; Statz 2021). Thus, although anonymity combined with cohesive
work groups leads to efficiency in the urban
context, the literature suggests that dense and
personal acquaintanceships between the courtroom workgroup and the community, when
combined with cohesive court actors, also encourages negotiation and informality to resolve
cases (Fahnestock and Geiger 1993; Worden and
Clark 2019; Statz 2021).
Third, when faced with budgetary constraints, acquaintanceship density can also be
a lens through which to examine how com
munities respond. From the broader frame of
entrepreneurial innovation, Jan Flora and her
colleagues (1997) argue that the ability of communities to become solvent in the wake of bud-
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get shortfalls is dependent on the density of
homogeneity of interpersonal networks, which
they term social infrastructure. Small population communities often have a smaller tax base
but need to provide and maintain the same essential buildings and services as larger communities (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990). Often,
American municipalities seek to derive revenue
primarily from nonresidents by attracting outside investment and sales taxes rather than
through property or local income taxes, but
communities do not have equal opportunities
to shift this burden (Harvey 1989). In the context of neoliberal policy, the decision-sets available to community members depend on the
historical and sociostructural features of the
community (Brenner and Theodore 2005). For
example, Josh Pacewicz and John Robinson
(2020) point to decades of racial isolation in
Black suburbs of Chicago as a limiting factor
for developing new commercial activities. Thus
social infrastructures may allow communities
to mount a response, but the nature of this response is likely to vary across communities.
In the absence of fiscal opportunities, revenue generation through fines and fees has increasingly become the alternative source of sustaining revenue for local governments (Martin
2020; Fernandes et al. 2019). The precarity of
funding streams, particularly as it relates to the
judicial branch, results in a monetary myopia,
where revenue takes priority over other community needs and goals (Martin 2018). The increased use of monetary sanctions as local revenue generators often tilts the costs of the court
system toward marginalized communities that
are least able to pay (DOJ 2015; Henricks and
Harvey 2017; Brenner and Theodore 2005; Page
and Soss 2017; Rios 2019).
Certainly, acquaintanceship is not the only
dimension along which communities of different size categorizations may differ. For instance, sociologists have identified differences
in community characteristics that range from
socioeconomic and demographic patterns to
social attitudes and behaviors (Beggs, Haines,
and Hurlbert 1996; Glenn and Hill 1977). Although differences across community types
may be vast, and though they can also contribute to differential court outcomes across place,
prior work argues that acquaintanceship den-

sity is an important contributor to variation in
court processing and outcomes (Beggs, Haines,
and Hurlbert 1996; Glenn and Hill 1977). The
nature and functionality of a community’s acquaintanceship density—characterized here
across rural, urban, and in some cases, suburban distinctions—shape the entrance of cases
into the system (normative expectations), the
handling of cases within the system (courtroom
workgroups), and the governmental adaptations to increasingly stringent budgetary concerns (monetary myopia). The role of acquaintanceship across a variety of community
structures provides a more holistic understanding of the use of fines and fees as both punishment and revenue generation.
Data a n d M e t h o d s

This analysis draws on a subset of data from
the Multi-State Study of Monetary Sanctions
(Harris, Pattillo, and Sykes 2022, this volume).
We include four states in our analysis: Georgia,
Illinois, Minnesota, and Missouri. Following
initial conversations among the research collaborators of the larger eight state study, we
identified similar dynamics and differences between the communities studied in these four
states that we wanted to explore further. In particular, these four states share the general trait
of having a politically powerful major city (Atlanta, Chicago, Minneapolis, and St. Louis, respectively) and an associated metro area of
more than a million residents, as well as a sizable rural area. These traits provide important
analytical leverage in contrasting urban and rural experiences. These states also vary by region, court organization, and historical background. In greater Minnesota, for example,
tribal lands span many rural counties (Stewart
et al. 2022, this volume) and, as in Illinois, the
courts are organized under a unified state court
system. Georgia and Missouri, by contrast, are
characterized by decentralized court systems
(Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this volume).
In the original study design, we purposefully
sampled court systems in a variety of communities across these states with the explicit purpose
of including areas with different population
sizes and that varied across political, social, and
economic characteristics (for additional information on study design, see Harris, Pattillo, and
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Sykes 2022, this volume). Leveraging this variation, we began with a broad research question:
how do monetary sanctions operate differently
across communities of varying population density and size? After examining the data within
our states and discussing similarities and differences across the states, we sharpened our focus to the core question of how court structure
and organizational dynamics in these differing
communities affect how monetary sanctions
are imposed and monitored.
Because of the variation in courts’ jurisdictions across these different states, attempting
to categorize the communities included in this
analysis was particularly difficult. Within
county boundaries, populations are distributed
unevenly and scholars have documented the
challenges in classifying urban and rural
spaces, given that broad measures fail to capture its heterogeneity (Ellsworth and Weisheit
1997; Osgood and Chambers, 2000). The dynamics within courtrooms that we explore were
most apparent at the two ends of this continuum, rural and urban, and so we discuss these
communities at length.
The nature of the suburban communities
across and between these states varied greatly,
making it more difficult to draw comparisons.
In some cases, we studied courtrooms in suburban areas of large urban counties and in others we included suburban counties that included small cities or towns. 1 We focus
primarily on the urban-rural dichotomy in the
following analysis. Although there are limitations with any geographic coding scheme, the
use of qualitative data provides unique insight
into the lived experience of courtroom actors
and allows us to unpack some of the nuances
of court operations that are not possible in a
quantitative analysis of this type. We use the
general terms rural, urban, and suburban to describe the communities studied. The communities we studied are quite heterogeneous; details on their characteristics are presented in
table 1 (see also Harris et al. 2017). One limitation of this analysis is that additional community differences, other than acquaintanceship,
may affect these courtroom dynamics. Such
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considerations, however, are beyond the scope
of this article.
The specific sampling strategy varied across
these four states due to differences in how the
courts operate (Harris, Pattillo, and Sykes 2022,
this volume). Illinois and Minnesota have a single unified court system organized by district
and then county. Thus Illinois and Minnesota
sample from a greater number of counties but
a similar number of court systems as Missouri
and Georgia. Courts in Georgia and Missouri
are decentralized, with several levels of courts
operating independently in counties and cities.
In each community sampled in those states, we
observed courts at each of the levels. Georgia’s
court system is organized by three levels—limited jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, and appellate, with five classes of trial-level courts that
operate at the county or circuit level. In Missouri, we observed circuit courts, which primarily adjudicate felonies, and municipal courts,
which hear cases involving misdemeanor, ordinance, and traffic offenses. We selected the
metropolitan region of St. Louis for our study
given the attention received by this community
after the killing of Michael Brown and the subsequent investigations of the criminal legal system (DOJ 2015).
For this study, we used data from courtroom
ethnographic observations and qualitative interviews with court actors including judges, attorneys, probation officers, and clerks. Across
the four states, we conducted 910 hours of observations and 248 interviews. Both sets of data
were coded using the master codebooks for the
overall project (Harris, Pattillo, and Sykes 2022,
this volume). We closely examined the following codes in the interview data: normative culture of the court, purpose of LFOs, system
strain or efficiency, fiscal politics, defendant
characteristics, and decision-maker personal
networks, and types and amounts of LFOs. Similarly, we examined the following codes in the
observation data: personal networks, neighborhood or community, types and amounts of
monetary sanctions, ability to pay, compliance
or noncompliance, descriptions of the courtroom, and familiarity among court actors. We

1. Such communities are akin to medium metro and small metro categories as defined by the 2013 NCHS urban-
rural classification scheme for counties (Ingram and Franco 2014).
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Table 1. County and Community Characteristics
Population Category

% Poverty

% Black

% Latino

Georgia
Urban county
Urban city
Suburban county
Suburban-urban city
Rural county
Rural small town

>1,000,000
200,000–499,999
100,000–249,999
25,000–49,999
10,000–24,999
<10,000

18
25
20
27
28
36

44
52
4
8
50
36

8
6
33
46
7
9

Illinois
Urban city
Urban-suburban county
Urban-suburban county
Rural-suburban county
Urban-suburban city
Rural county
Rural county
Rural county
Rural county

>1,000,000
500,000–999,999
100,000–249,999
100,000–249,999
50,000–99,999
10,000–24,999
10,000–24,999
<10,000
<10,000

23
17
5
15
12
6
21
36
23

32
24
7
19
6
<1
6
37
32

29
25
17
5
11
2
3
2
2

Minnesota
Urban county
Urban county
Suburban county
Suburban county
Rural county
Rural county

>1,000,000
500,000–999,999
100,000–249,999
100,000–249,999
25,000–49,999
25,000–49,999

13
17
7
8
22
10

13
12
5
6
1
3

7
7
4
7
2
8

Missouri
Urban-suburban county
Urban city
Suburban-rural county
Rural small town
Suburban-rural community
Rural small town

500,000–999,999
250,000–499,999
50,000–99,999
25,000–49,999
25,000–49,999
10,000–24,999

9
25
17
19
25
25

25
50
8
4
14
6

3
4
2
8
2
11

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2014.
Note: 2014 American Community Survey five-year averages.

then contrasted findings and considered
themes across the different community categories using memos we developed for each state.
We have not included the names of these communities to ensure the anonymity of the interview respondents.
Findings

In the analysis, we use acquaintanceship density as a frame to understand how monetary
sanctions are used and understood among

court actors across community contexts and
within courtroom workgroups. First, we describe how acquaintanceship density influences
the organizational dynamics in the day-to-day
management of the court and assessment of
monetary sanctions. We then consider how local court contexts—conceptualized along lines
of acquaintanceship density—influence court
actors’ perceptions of local funding mechanisms and their role and representation in state
policymaking.
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Acquaintanceship Within the Courtroom

Consistent with research on courts as permeable institutions (Fahnestock and Geiger 1993),
courtroom interactions were influenced by the
nature of social relationships outside the courtroom. Acquaintanceship density, whether personal familiarity or lack of it, affected how
amounts of monetary sanctions were determined, how defendants’ ability to pay were considered, and how unpaid sanctions were managed.
Routinization and Courtroom Workgroups
In urban jurisdictions, court actors cited typical courtroom workgroup routines and familiarity with each other’s going rates for offenses
when considering monetary sanctions (Eisenstein, Fleming, and Nardulli 1988). Rather than
tailoring amounts based on individual circumstances or ability to pay, court actors fell back
on broader routines and norms. Although these
going rates were broadly observed in the case
of monetary sanctions in both amounts and
payment schedules in all jurisdictions (see Martin, Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk 2022, this volume), we observed them more frequently in urban jurisdictions. The sheer number of cases
processed in larger courts and the limited time
available to negotiate each case often resulted
in little variation across defendants. Court actors in urban jurisdictions described being too
busy to concern themselves with the specifics
of monetary sanctions. A prosecutor in an urban Illinois court remarked, “We are so busy
and overwhelmed here. The fines and fees is
like the absolute least of our concern. I mean
it really is.” A public defender in an urban Missouri court described the sentencing process.
“They read it [the financial sanction] off like it’s
matter of fact so I don’t see any type of thought
going into it. That’s the same with the prosecutor’s recommendation too. There’s just a standard number that they shoot out.”
Court actors were less likely to be personally
familiar with defendants and often relied on
broader and less individualized understandings of defendants’ economic positions. Court
actors expressed awareness that defendants
were likely to be indigent and were less likely
to impose discretionary fines. In Georgia, a
judge in an urban jurisdiction described being
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creative in sentencing to avoid imposing an additional fine: “Most of our defendants are indigent. What’s the point of assessing a fine? Some
crimes statutorily have fines and it is so ingrained in this jurisdiction that we really just
don’t fine folks because they can’t afford it that
we tend to pronounce technically illegal sentences because for a drug trafficking offense we
say it’s 10 years to serve because that’s the mandatory minimum and we forget to say it’s also
$100,000 fine.”
Although some court costs, fees, and assessments were outside the discretion of the court,
the presumption of indigency in urban jurisdictions often led court actors to more readily offer
payment plans or community service as an alternative to payment to soften the impact of
financial penalties. In urban state courts in
Missouri, we observed judges regularly waiving
fines if the defendant was sentenced to prison
or had spent a period in jail. In one urban felony court, we observed a case in which the individual had spent 177 days in jail for a probation violation that was issued because of a new
arrest for a drug crime. The judge agreed to
time served and waived all costs except for
mandatory court costs.
Similarly in Minnesota, urban court actors
frequently waived portions of financial penalties, resulting in lower mean amounts of monetary sanctions in larger metro areas than in
smaller rural communities or suburban areas.
In our ethnographic observations, these interactions were often depersonalized. For example,
a judge in a large urban Minnesota courtroom
greeted a defendant by saying, “You are the first
of many who I will see today, I know that you’re
taking this seriously. You know it is very dangerous when you drink and drive.” In suburban
courtrooms in the same county, however, judges
sometimes showed more personal familiarity
with particular defendants. In another drunk
driving case, a suburban court judge asked,
“Have we met before?” The answer was yes, on
the defendant’s previous driving under the influence conviction. “You know, I’m going to bug
you because you were here last year and I told
you not to do it again and you did it again.”
In urban and larger suburban counties, each
city may have its own prosecuting entity for
misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors. In
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contrast, the county prosecutor performs the
city prosecutions in many smaller counties. For
clients, this means that their cases must often
be considered individually and are less likely to
be considered jointly, as would often occur in
larger jurisdictions. As one public defender
told us,
I’m talking about misdemeanors or gross
misdemeanors, not felonies. Felonies are
handled by the county. If you commit a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor crime in
[Suburb A], you will have court on Monday.
No ifs, ands, or buts about it because that’s
the day that they have court. Let’s say you
committed a crime there. You drove without
a license in [Suburb A]. Then, couple weeks
later, you drove without a license in [Suburb
B]. Well, then you’re going to have court on
Wednesday. They can’t combine them, because it’s two different prosecutors, two different days. Now, you have to come to court
two separate times. Well, then you drove
without a license again in [Suburb C]. Now,
you’re coming to court on Tuesday. You know
what I mean? . . . They miss court because
they were supposed [to] be in three different
[places].

Overall, the urban courts had greater capacity to combine such cases but were more likely
to be characterized by routinization, anonymity, and less individualization in the sentencing
of monetary sanctions.
Acquaintanceship Density as
a Double-Edged Sword

In smaller communities, personal relationships were important in garnering flexibility
and generating variation in assessing monetary
sanctions relative to the going rates of larger
jurisdictions. Court staff was pulled from a
smaller pool of residents in rural communities
and the social ties between legal actors were
often stronger. In both our observations and
conversations with court actors, we found that
personal familiarity mattered in court decision-
making. As a defense attorney in Georgia remarked, “I feel like when you’re in smaller jurisdictions like that, your relationships are very
important. I think it makes you have more op-

tions. I know lady justice is blind, but we all
know that who you know sometimes helps your
clients. I do think that, from what I hear from
many other people, attorneys don’t like taking
cases here because they feel like their options
are limited. I’ve not really had that experience
there. I think I’ve been treated very fairly, and
maybe it is because I was in that community
for so long.”
In this case, the attorney felt that she was
given a better outcome because of her familiarity with the local workgroup, but was concerned
that outsiders might not be received as favorably. Similarly, a public defender in Minnesota
explained that though judges are inclined to be
flexible when it comes to monetary sanctions,
they are careful not to request leniency in every
case to maintain the strength of the workgroup
norms.
The smaller number of court actors and
their strong ties to each other also led to a
“stickiness” to cultures surrounding monetary
sanctions because the very small number of
decision-makers have a large influence on
amounts and collection practices. Court actors
typically held these positions for long periods.
For example, in Illinois and Missouri court actors often cycled through the different positions, the public defender becoming the prosecutor and then later the judge within the same
court or jurisdiction. In a rural Georgia jurisdiction, the public defender in one traffic court
was the judge in a neighboring municipal
court. Court actors were described as “related
to everybody” and “born here and raised here,”
and the workplace as one where everyone
“knows each other on a first-name basis.” We
also observed how routinization could be disrupted via personnel change in these counties.
In Missouri, one long-standing municipal
judge retired during the observation period.
Court sessions that followed the retirement
were noticeably more chaotic, defendants were
generally more confused about procedures,
and instances when the new presiding judge
would depart from the city attorney’s original
recommendation, something rare under the
former judge, were more frequent.
Although court actors across the rural-
urban continuum were familiar with the economic health of their defendants in a broad
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sense, in rural courts judges and attorneys were
more likely to have personal financial knowledge about the defendant or their family. We
observed that this acquaintanceship led to assumptions about ability to pay based on familiarity rather than on a consistent or standardized process. Community stability, and at
times, intergenerational involvement in the
criminal justice system led to both assumptions surrounding the case itself as well as financial capability. As a court actor in Minnesota remarked, “Oh, yeah. Yeah, I’ve had three
generations, in some cases. I had the grandfather, I had the son, and I’ve got the daughter.”
Although this greater familiarity between court
actors and defendants led to often a more personalized understanding of financial situations, it did not always result in lower financial
penalties. Some judges had higher expectations of defendants they knew personally, and
at times took a more patronizing approach.
One rural judge in Illinois said, “Strictly based
on his parents, he could probably get jobs
working for about three or four different lucid
senior citizens, mowing their grass and stuff,
where he could have easily made more than
that on a regular basis and still supported his
meth habit. Why did he want to go to all that
trouble? I don’t get it. It’s a culture that I don’t
think we understand or can’t understand.”
This familiarity sometimes led court actors
to be less empathetic to the financial struggles
of defendants. A Minnesota clerk observed that
the culture in some of the rural districts tended
to be “a little harder on people than in the
metro area” as court actors in smaller communities were more likely to follow the letter of the
law than was observed in urban communities.
Alternatives to monetary sanctions, such as
community service, were more scarce in rural
areas. In one small court in Missouri, we observed that litigants were only given one option
for community service if they could not pay.
Individuals had to work at the county-run recycling center, but the facility was only open during traditional business hours and the nature
of the physical work made it untenable for
some individuals. This situation often left defendants in more rural communities with fines
and fees beyond their reasonable ability to pay,
with few options to escape the debt.
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Anonymity did not necessarily lead to lenience in rural jurisdictions, particularly for
nonresidents, who can be viewed as potential
sources of revenue. Rural counties were often
explicit in their desire to collect LFOs from nonresidents to shift the burden of revenue generation away from members of their communities, consistent with emerging research in this
area (Pacewicz and Robinson 2020). These policies were most evident in counties that were
home to major interstate highways or large
events such as music festivals. A rural prosecutor in Illinois described taking advantage of
truckers driving through, “some of these counties when they get a trucker on a construction
zone ticket, they will just gouge them and get
all the money that they can out of them.” In
Georgia, judges, particularly in traffic court,
would assess fines and pay-only probation for
drivers passing through but would not offer
conversion to community service until the defendant had been on probation for several
months. Conversely, in a municipal court
within that county, the judge preferred to give
local residents several months to attempt to
pay off legal debt before placing them on probation. With local residents, court actors in this
jurisdiction spent more time discussing the
ability to pay and employment situations. Differential treatment in the LFO amounts imposed, collection practices, and consequences
for nonpayment within this rural jurisdiction
appeared to be related to differences in acquaintanceship between court actors and defendants.
Although acquaintanceship density aligned
traditionally along the rural and urban continuum, we did observe one deviant case in the
analysis. The municipal courts in the St. Louis
suburbs share some of these traits in that the
municipalities are tight knit and draw from a
small number of court actors (see also Huebner
and Giuffre 2022, this volume). Court actors often had a long tenure in the court, were pillars
of the community, and had a wariness about
outside control, which is consistent with work
on acquaintanceship density (Fahnestock and
Geiger 1993; Singer 2014). These small municipal courts had similar dynamics of court actors
swapping positions. A judge in another part of
the state described the court structure: “I heard
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that you have a prosecutor in one county and
I’m the judge in that county and then you’re
the judge in one county and I’m the prosecutor,
well the city really, the municipality.” This familiarity led to a distinct lack of any adversarial
atmosphere in the courtrooms and routinization of decision-making, consistent with the
urban courts. At the same time, the court actors
took more time to hear the perspective of the
litigant and, as in Georgia and Illinois, were often lenient with known members of the community while levying higher fines and costs on
those who simply traveled through the community or attended a concert or other local event.
Overall, acquaintanceship mattered for how
court actors thought about and enacted monetary sanctions in their courtrooms. In urban
courts, mechanization of cases and relative anonymity of defendants led to going rates. Defendants were often presumed to be indigent,
but few counties had the time for more formal
determinations of ability to pay. Familiarity
among court actors and between court actors
and defendants in smaller courts did lead to
more variation in the sentencing process, but
personal assumptions and community ties led
to sometimes uneven application.
Economic Sanctions as Revenue Generation

Recent research suggests an increasing reliance
on economic sanctions to fund local criminal
legal systems (Page and Soss 2017; Rios 2019).
Our findings indicate that this type of financial
extraction is more common in lower courts and
rural communities. Across the communities we
studied, court actors’ perceptions of the importance of monetary sanctions as a tool for funding local courts and governments varied.
Whereas urban court actors felt disconnected
from the finances of the county, the tight acquaintanceship density between court actors
and local budget officials in smaller, rural communities contributed to the perception that
court-imposed monetary sanctions were a critical source of court funding. In smaller counties, some court actors mentioned hearing directly from county board officials regarding
revenue and community finances. This pressure affected how monetary sanctions were imposed and collected. Although we did find
some variations in the aggregate amounts im-

posed across rural, suburban, and urban communities, differences more often resulted from
actors’ willingness to waive certain fines or fees
and the degree to which actors pursued the collection of unpaid debt. This pressure was more
often perception than a true balancing of the
books, which is consistent with prior theoretical work (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990) and recent work by Kate O’Neil, Tyler Smith, and Ian
Kennedy (2022, this volume), who found little
county-level difference in the portion of budgets gained from monetary sanctions. Research
indicates that judges in rural counties are more
likely to sentence individuals to higher LFO
amounts and punish nonpayment more
harshly, but that increased poverty in these areas may not lead to greater collection (O’Neil,
Smith, and Kennedy 2022, this volume; Stewart
et al. 2022, this volume).
Monetary sanctions were conceptualized as
having a clear dual purpose in the court system
among rural court actors, both as a punitive
sanction and as essential to local government
functioning. A rural prosecutor in Illinois emphasized that though he did not consider the
revenue when imposing the amount, he did acknowledge the necessity of financially supporting the court: “Well, we do have to assess fines
and court costs in order for the system to function. I mean, there has to be an inflow of money
in order to fund the court system too. I don’t
feel any pressure. I don’t think that it’s really
appropriate to say, ‘Well, how much money can
we collect in this case? How much money can
we make, in a sense, in this case?’ I don’t think
that’s appropriate. I think it should be what’s
the appropriate sanction or penalty for the
crime that was committed.”
A clerk in a rural jurisdiction in Illinois said,
“The purpose of it [monetary sanctions] is to
help the government function. County as well
as state, how do I feel about it? I feel about that
like I feel about everything else in the United
States, it’s the best we got right now, and until
somebody comes by with a better improvement
on it, it’s the best show in town.” Even if this
pressure did not always translate to the amount
imposed, it often did have an impact on both
the strategies and alternatives to payment. In
Missouri, nonpayment of economic sanctions
was seen as a larger concern in rural areas. A

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

j u s t i c e b y g e o g r a ph y

probation officer remarked, “If the judge is very
strict on that, you know they use those funds
to pay salaries for the county or whatever, I
mean, they want that money paid because
that’s how the county operates. So some areas
are different. Kansas City, I don’t think that
you’re probably going to get anybody revoked
up there for court costs.” Court actors in rural
jurisdictions more often equated unpaid court
debt with issues of funding, both to their salaries and to the system. One superior court
judge in a suburban Georgia community explained it this way: “I’ve always felt sorry for the
judges in municipal courts. And some state
courts, I guess. Maybe magistrate courts. Because the governing body keeps a close watch
on how much money comes in.” Court actors
across communities were aware of these differences and there was a sense among these court
actors that urban jurisdictions were less likely
to pursue nonpayment and that there was not
the same fiscal pressure from local officials.
Court actors in rural communities were often unaware of either the extent to which monetary sanctions actually were collected or the
true impact on the county’s finances, despite
the consistent, perceived pressure to contribute
to the system’s funding. Nonetheless, regular
efforts were made to try to collect money. A defense attorney in a rural Illinois community
who was previously a state’s attorney explained:
“There were, I don’t remember, let’s say there’s
$200,000 of uncollected fine and costs. Yeah, I
made an effort to try and collect those things.
Most state’s attorneys make an effort. It’s difficult. That’s why they entered into an agreement with this collection agency. How much
revenue that’s generating, I don’t know. I never
have seen the statistics for that. I think most
state’s attorneys because in the smaller poorer
counties, yeah, they need the money and that
money comes from criminal fines and costs.”
Data were often poor or unavailable to courtroom actors as to how much courts collected
through monetary sanctions. However, particularly in counties where budgets were tight, the
general perception was that this revenue was
locally significant and affected how court actors
considered, imposed, and collected monetary
sanctions.
Because fines and fees are often statutorily
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dictated, court actors used other avenues to try
to buoy the finances of local courts. At times,
they considered the financial incentives attached to different charges, particularly traffic
charges, which led them to downgrade or upgrade charges to direct funds locally rather
than to the state. In Georgia, a rural county traffic judge would routinely downgrade speeding
tickets to avoid the imposition of a state-based
“super speeder” fee that went to the Department of Driver Services. The judge would instead assess a fine that would be retained by
the county. This decision also results in saving
points on defendants’ licenses that would otherwise jeopardize their insurance rates and potentially professional driving privileges. As one
defense attorney explained, “Somebody can either pay the state super speeder or they can pay
more locally, which generates revenue for
them, and they’ll reduce the ticket. That’s typically where I see the local . . . mainly in probate
courts, where they see it as an opportunity to
generate revenue for them, rather than the
state. Because they’ve reduced the tickets, so
the super speeder, they pay the local folks what
they would have paid in super speeder.”
In this way, the court was responsive to the
needs of the community and the client. Similarly, a rural prosecutor in Illinois related how
counties will negotiate the downgrading of tickets for speeding in a construction zone ticket
for higher fines: “So we try to be reasonable but
we gotta pay bills too, so we try to make our
money that we’ve got to make, but so it’s like a
fine balance between the two.” In these examples, court actors express how they attempt to
balance financing the country and enacting justice and punishment.
In Missouri, the structure of local monetary
sanctions incentivized the use of pretrial detention in local jails using what are called “board
bills.” This is one of the key differences in urban and rural communities and has been the
topic of substantial policy discussion in the
state (Council of State Governments Justice
Center 2018). These fees allow the county to
charge for the cost per day for room and board
in the jail. Court actors indicated that the cost
varied greatly depending on the jurisdiction
and could quickly become very expensive when
coupled with other fines and fees defendants
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owed. All jails can charge individuals for jail
costs and there is a state reimbursement program as well. Rural jails double dip, and this is
a substantial source of income for some rural
sheriffs. A Missouri probation officer in an urban jurisdiction explained: “Some of the rural
jurisdictions also put board bills in there. So if
they’re confined pretrial all their confining
costs are rolled up in it, and those can go into
the thousands of dollars, which is probably
some of the costs that I have the biggest amount
of heartburn for. Just because every time they
go back for a revocation hearing they get locked
up, that bill just gets ratcheted up . . . And it’s
just like a never ending . . . for some of our clients who can barely make ends meet, that’s like
debtor’s prison.”
Court actors understood that some rural jurisdictions had limited financial means and
needed to recoup the costs of local incarceration. However, the sense among court actors
was that perhaps these fees also incentivized
these communities to revoke individuals on
probation and incarcerate more frequently.
These practices were not observed in Missouri’s
urban courts.
In contrast, court actors in urban jurisdictions did not see themselves as directly responsible for funding the system or their communities. They in fact felt further removed from the
revenue-raising arm of local government, and
this theme rarely emerged in conversations. Instead, some were skeptical of the destination
of this money and less likely to see monetary
sanctions as important to the sentence. A prosecutor in an urban court in Illinois remarked,
“I don’t know if it’s helping with the budget or
not. I don’t know if it’s hurting the people. If
it’s supposed to be some sort of deterrent, I
highly doubt that it’s the deterrent people think
it is. I have no idea if that’s in any way helped
with the budget, with the automation, because
we’re so automated, all of that. I don’t know.”
When asked whether they had a sense of where
the money does go, the judge said, “No idea.”
Similarly, a defense attorney in the same jurisdiction said that it was not their role to help
fund the government: “the money is for the
government. Whatever crime was committed
against society, there’s no relationship between
that and the money. You know the money goes

into the government’s coffers.” In Minnesota,
a prosecutor expressed dissatisfaction that rural counties paid close attention: “I guess out
in some of the rural counties they actually
count the money, so they put it on people, I
don’t know. I’m all for high taxes, myself. These
people have a hard enough time to go. Wondering where you’re going to sleep the next night,
where your next meal’s going to come from.
That’s enough to just drive anybody off their
rocker.” Urban court actors saw their jobs as
separate from the revenue-raising county governments, were more detached from the economic workings of the community, and felt less
pressure to support local finances. Viewing this
dynamic through the lens of acquaintanceship,
the social distance between urban court actors
and local governments led to less pressure to
consider the dual role of monetary sanctions
in their day-to-day imposition and collection of
these fines and fees.
Incentives both real and perceived to fund
portions of the local court system led court actors to treat the role of monetary sanctions differently in the courts, affecting the charge,
amounts imposed, alternatives to payment,
and collection attempts. In communities where
court actors felt less pressure to fund their local
courthouses, monetary sanctions were often
lower and consequences for nonpayment less
severe.
The Legislature and Policy Change

The legislative landscape around monetary
sanctions is constantly changing. Court actors,
particularly in rural and suburban areas, frequently meet these reforms with skepticism
and frustration. Statutory changes often resulted in adjustments to the amounts of nondiscretionary and required fees, costs, and assessments, which court actors interpreted as
limiting their discretion and funneling resources from their communities to state coffers. Like Tyler Smith, Christina Thompson,
and Michele Cadigan (2022, this volume), we
find that legislative changes to monetary sanctions are not implemented uniformly across
jurisdictions. Instead, local court actors respond to this legislative coercion by developing
localized norms that guide court behavior, interpreting and negotiating the laws’ meaning
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among themselves. Court actors across the
rural-urban continuum differed in their perceptions and interpretations of these changes. Like
the dynamics outlined thus far, the acquaintanceship density of communities influenced
how court actors saw themselves situated
against the state legislature and how they interacted with each other, which in turn affected
their support for legislative changes and their
perceptions of their agency to work around
these changes.
Court actors in rural and suburban communities often expressed feeling detached or ignored from the legislature and perceived that
policy changes were dictated by the needs and
whims of the criminal justice systems of the big
cities. For example, recent legislative reforms
in Missouri capped the amounts of fines that
could be assessed for minor traffic violations
and precluded imprisonment for failure to pay
fines. Several rural judges felt that this limited
their discretion. One judge commented, “I
think discretion is a really good thing. I think
judges need to have discretion. And I think the
prosecutors need to have discretion as well, and
I think the legislature needs to stick its nose
out of it. But that’s about where I think we are
right now.” Some research describes this as the
“urbanormativity” of policymakers and the law,
which privileges cities and urban issues (Fulkerson and Thomas 2019; Statz 2021). Court actors in more rural areas felt that these mandatory fees put undue burdens on residents and
did not allow them the flexibility to assess what
they deemed appropriate financial sanctions
for residents with limited means. The familiarity and tightness of social ties within the community discussed previously led to this greater
desire for localized discretion and flexibility.
These court actors often felt a greater responsibility to balance community needs and
unique community circumstances when considering monetary sanctions.
Legislatively imposed sanctions are often
designated for the state’s general fund, rather
than for financing local systems. In the states
examined, these statutorily imposed fees or
costs sometimes funded programs that are far-
flung from criminal justice (Harris et al. 2017).
For court actors in rural and suburban communities, changes to mandatory fees were often
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seen as unfair to the defendant and the county
given that these changes frequently resulted in
more money being diverted out of the community. In contrast, fines were often discretionary
and viewed as the punitive part of the financial
sentence. A judge in a suburban jurisdiction in
Georgia expressed frustration in his ability to
impose a financial penalty he felt was proportional to the crime because of the increased
statutory fees and surcharges:
Now, if I didn’t have the surcharges and the
more appropriate sentence would have been
the $200 fine, I would give the $200 fine. But
I’m not going to do the $200 fine because I
know the $100 fine is really a $200. . . . You
know, you have these games going on that I
have no control over, and so I’m back to the
financial ability of the person to pay. So, you
know, I have to be sensitive to that. But I can’t
address the proportionality of it because
they’re not . . . Because I don’t control that
proportionality. That’s added to the fine that
I thought was appropriate.

Court actors in smaller communities were
well aware of the economic struggles of their
clients and the community broadly and thought
that they should have the autonomy to levy
monetary sanctions that reflected community
norms and economic abilities. Mandatory fines
and surcharges, though, impinged on the discretion they did have to impose an appropriate
sentence.
Court actors also felt that the state was enriching itself through these changes. Court actors in more rural jurisdictions complained
that the portion of the mandatory charges that
remained locally was shrinking, while the state
was profiting off these fees or redirecting funds
to address the needs of urban court systems. A
rural prosecutor in Illinois commented,
I think that hurts the local government a lot
more because where you could expect somebody to pay x amount on all their fines and
costs . . . well you’re taking a bigger chunk of
that out and sending it to the state, so less of
that’s coming to the county. So on the county
business side of it, it’s hurting the bottom
line, and we’re also hurting because Spring-
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field’s so screwed up we’re hemorrhaging residents so we have less of a tax base, but I
don’t know maybe we’ll fix those things so
that people have the ability to pay, I don’t
know.

Court actors in Minnesota expressed similar
themes, suggesting that the state distributed
funds unequally, redirecting resources toward
big cities. One Minnesota respondent explained: “What happens when we collect supervision fees that go into the general state fund
but we don’t see the benefits in rural Minnesota
of that general state fund. They go to Hennepin
and Ramsey [two large urban counties].” Another respondent echoed this theme: “Yeah,
they go and pay for roads and freeways downtown.” As noted, individuals in smaller communities were keenly aware of the fiscal needs
of their communities.
Although recent changes to monetary sanction policy in the study states were often passed
in the name of progressive reform, court actors
were skeptical as to the local impact of these
reforms and felt that their own fiscal needs and
discretion in determining sentences were lessened by these efforts. Court actors in rural communities felt that they were being punished for
the poor choices made by urban judges and
municipalities. This was particularly the case
in Missouri where changes had been substantial following the Department of Justice Investigation into Ferguson and the resulting legal
changes (see Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this
volume). Decision-makers in rural locations often remarked that Ferguson and the state legislative changes directed toward the problems
in St. Louis inadvertently and negatively affected well-functioning rural jurisdictions. Specifically, several judges argued blanket reform
policies were burdensome and ineffective because judges lost discretion over cases and defense attorneys had fewer negotiating options
during plea bargaining. One rural municipal
court judge contended, “I’m not saying there
weren’t any problems in municipal courts because I knew two or three problem courts down
here that had problems that were found in the
Ferguson investigations, but you used to didn’t
see that stuff down state like you did out of St.
Louis and Jackson county. There were a few,

everywhere you’ve got a few rotten apples in
there.” Although Missouri is an exemplary case,
court actors in rural communities across these
states felt that they were being punished for the
poor management of the overstretched courts
of the big cities and the resulting reforms that
often moved toward greater standardization.
Because of the local importance of county finances, court actors saw themselves as being
restricted in their ability to be responsive both
to the needs of their residents and that the state
was siphoning off local funds.
Urban court actors felt similarly, that the legislature was out of touch with court processes
but interpreted the day-to-day impact of these
changes differently in ways that reflect the differing role monetary sanctions played in their
courtrooms. A clerk in Illinois said, “If it was
legislatures that made those decisions and it’s
a statute did they actually ever go into a courtroom or did they have any concept of what they
were legislating before it happened?” A judge
in an urban Georgia superior court bemoaned
the opacity of the system of surcharges and
add-ons required by statute as he described the
standard sentencing form used in superior
courts. “I don’t know what all fine surcharges
or add-ons are required by the laws, but that
suggests that there is a universe of fines that
are required and are applicable to the offenses
. . . but you can see there’s not a discussion of
what they are. This form is standard around the
state.” Another judge in the same jurisdiction
described surcharges as “imposed by the legislature” and not something that their county
“has just cooked up.” This judge further says,
“I’ve never, in the six years of the continuing
judicial legal education that we’ve had, no one’s
ever explained what all those different fees are.”
Like the rural court actors, these individuals
did not feel that the legislature had their communities’ best interests in mind.
However, when changes were made to statutorily imposed monetary sanctions, urban
court actors were slower to implement these
changes and felt that they had more autonomy.
Urban actors often prioritized the going rates
of their jurisdiction over the often-changing
specialized fees imposed by the legislature or
offered more accommodations for those unable to pay. Familiarity among the court actors
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and a desire for court efficiency motivated their
decision-making, and not necessarily commitments to the community or local budget officials. These court actors were often critical of
the idea that they had no autonomy or discretion over even these mandatory charges and felt
less responsible to mandate fees exactly as the
statute dictated. A defense attorney in an urban
jurisdiction in Illinois commented on the variability among judges in his court: “There was
one judge who retired who didn’t care about it,
and would tell them very bluntly when he gave
them whatever the sentence was that he didn’t
care about fees and fines, and he would always
terminate their probation satisfactorily no matter what they owed, or how much they owed. . . .
They always say that they’re not allowed to reduce the fines and costs.” The attorney touches
on the fact that despite the belief that little discretion is possible with these mandated costs,
judges do have the power to exercise discretion
in regard to collection, if they so choose. The
need to process cases efficiently and coordinate
the large number of actors involved in the process often took priority to policy changes.
Overall, the actors in all communities were
wary of legislative changes and mandates, both
feeling as though ongoing changes ignored the
realities of their courtrooms and communities.
Individuals in smaller communities thought
that legal changes, particularly mandatory fees
and surcharges, limited their ability to respond
to the specialized needs of their communities,
reflecting the importance of close acquaintanceship ties. In contrast, actors in bigger
communities lacked intimate knowledge of
their defendants but believed that legislation
should allow for efficient and less burdensome
imposition of monetary sanctions.
Discussion

In the wake of protracted economic decline and
increased fiscal pressures on local governments, a growing body of scholarship has established the pervasiveness of monetary sanctions across U.S. communities (Fernandes et al.
2019; Harris 2016; Huebner and Giuffre 2022,
this issue; Martin et al. 2018). As inhabited institutions (Ulmer 2019), courts are shaped in
meaningful ways by the local structures in
which they are embedded. Thus the application
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and meaning of monetary sanctions likely varies by characteristics of the community context. Building on Harris’s (2016) work on the
punishment continuum, we highlight local
variation in monetary sanctions, focusing on
how structural and organizational characteristics impact the local cultures and meaning of
this sanction. Drawing on qualitative interviews across communities of different sizes,
our study explores the role of acquaintanceship
density patterning—one way to conceptualize
broad interpersonal differences in community
size—in how court actors thought about monetary sanctions and the place of these sanctions
in enacting justice.
We find that larger, urban courts are more
likely to develop going rates among court actors
in efforts to process cases quickly. Relying on
shorthand to determine factors such as indigency led to efficient case processing and often
lower fines for those who were able to pay
quickly. However, individuals who were not able
to pay were rarely given much time to describe
their needs to the judge or to request special
consideration from the court, which could result in protracted court involvement, particularly if they were unable to immediately comply
with the conditions of the sentence. In contrast, high acquaintanceship density was more
common in more rural locations, characterized
by familiarity and personal relationships both
between court actors and community members, which allowed for greater flexibility and
individualization, although this did not automatically translate to more leniency. Indeed,
individuals in rural areas known to the court
may be less likely to have fines reduced or fees
waived; however, acquaintanceship density
could also promote harsher punishment if individuals were viewed as outsiders. Acquaintanceship density does not exist in a vacuum
and is conditioned by the nature of the court
and the structure of the broader community.
These findings also align with other works that
note the importance of monetary sanctions as
revenue, and the perceived extra benefit of collecting fines from nonresidents (Martin 2020;
Pacewicz and Robinson 2020).
More generally, acquaintanceship density
shaped the view of court actors around monetary sanctions as a funding source. Actors more
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closely linked to municipal and county-level
governance bodies were more likely to view finance as a special consideration in how sanctions were applied and used. In contrast, actors
operating in more urban areas were less likely
to link monetary sanctions decision-making to
the economic livelihoods of their communities.
These views are also reflected in the broader
orientation of local governance toward the legislative policies that guide decision-making.
Court actors outside urban areas viewed reform
policies with hostility and suggested that they
were oriented around the needs and concerns
of major metropolitan areas. Moreover, their
close relationships to local power structures
furthered their feelings that statutes allowed
for few instances of discretion without negative
consequences for their communities. It is not
clear from this work how these translate into
legal decision-making. However, given the discretion afforded to actors in this realm, this is
an important avenue of inquiry.
Differences between communities were less
pronounced in Minnesota, in both the amounts
imposed and the perceptions of court actors.
This case provides potential insight as to how
to mitigate these local pressures. Amounts of
monetary sanctions assessed and collected
were much lower in Minnesota than in other
states because the state legislature has scaled
back its reliance on LFOs in recent years. Moreover, individual courts and court actors have
comparatively little financial incentive to impose heavy legal financial obligations because
the lion’s share of the proceeds returns to the
state general fund rather than to individual
counties or courts. This helps account for the
concern some court actors express that imposing heavy fines and fees in greater Minnesota
will simply “pay for roads and freeways downtown.” Overall, reducing the pressure counties
feel to fund themselves through fines and fees
would likely result in reduced pressure to impose and collect monetary sanctions. Decreasing these financial penalties is likely beneficial
both to defendants in their chances of success
in completing their sentences and to counties
that often spend more in attempting to collect
monetary sanctions than they can recoup
(Crowley, Menendez, and Eisen 2020).
Overall, these findings advance the litera-

ture in several ways. First, the expansion of observations beyond urban courts allows for a
more nuanced assessment of how courts are
inhabited institutions, influenced both by the
individuals within the institution and by the
broader context. Second, we tie together established characteristics of courtrooms, such as
routinization and discretion, to the structural
realities that vary immensely across place. Our
finding that acquaintanceship density influences both the role and nature of monetary
sanctions provides a fuller picture of the factors
that lead to varying local legal cultures surrounding monetary sanctions (Harris 2016).
Features such as acquaintanceship density and
fiscal constraints, which are structural and relational, play a critical part in the assessment,
monitoring, and collection of fines and fees
across communities. Further work is needed to
understand how such factors evolve to establish processual norms. Moreover, future work
in this area must grapple with the racialized
patterns that often overlay acquaintanceship
density patterns, resource constraints, and
monetary sanctions. In the context of perpetual
policy adjustments, our study suggests that
blanket policies, enacted to obtain more equal
outcomes across place, may not be nimble
enough to meet the varied needs of communities with different resources and acquaintanceship densities.
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